Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Lynn Johnstun v. J. H. Harrison : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
George S. Stewart; Patterson and Bayles; Attorneys for Defendant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Johnstun v. Harrison, No. 7174 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/857

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

--------

.

In the SupreDle Court
of the

State of Utah
~40HNSTUN,

PlitJ.ittttiff and Be3VJH)~t
Case No .

.vs.

7174

J. H. lf,ARRISON,
'

,. f!efe'lliJom..t onu1 Appellant

: .~

.'

~'/

Bn~f of Appellant J.

'··~·.
t

L. E D
·

'

·

.

.,.APR 23 1948
..
'

H. Harrison

GEORGE S. STEWART,
Roosevelt, Utah
PATTERSON AND BAYLES,
203..:5 Boston Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah

Atto.rneys

~or Defendant
and Appellan·t

·------- --------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
PAGE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ________________________________________________ 1
STATEMENT OF ERROR ---------------------------------------------------- 8
ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------10
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------·----------24

Statutes
U.C.A. 1943-25-14-4 ----------------------------------------------------9 and 14

Laws of 1947-25-6-21 ------------------------------------------------12 and 23
Cases Cited

Evans v. Reiser, 78 Utah 253, 2 Pac. 2d. 615 ________________________ 22
Franz v. Hanson, 104 Utah 112, 140 Pac. 3d. 631. ______________ ..21
Hamer v. Howell, 31 Utah 144, 86 Pac. 1073________________________19
Quigley v. Phelps, (Colo.), 132 Pac. 742 _______________________________ 21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the SupreDie Court
of the

State of Utah
LYXX JOHNSTUN,
Plaintiff and Respondent

Case No.

vs.
J. H. HARRISON,

7174

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT J. H. HARRISON

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 4th, 1947, there was an election held
for the election of City Councilmen in the City of Roosevelt, Duchesne County, State of Utah. At such election,
defendant and appellant, J. H. Harrison, and plaintiff
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and Respondent, Lynn Johnstun, each were candidates
for election to the office of City Councilman.
There were two political parties, one known as the
Peoples Party and one known as the Progressive Party.
There were three councilmen to be chosen for the city.
The name of plaintiff, Lynn Johnstun, appeared
under the Peoples Party Emblem and the name of defendant, J. H. Harrison, appeared under the emblem of
the Progressive Party. Thus, there were three councilmen on each party ticket.
At said election, the plaintiff, Lynn J ohnstun, received 205 votes and the defendant, J. H. Harrison, received 207 votes. Defendant Harrison was then issued a
certificate of election. The plaintiff initiated this contest, and the statement of contest, so far as material here,
alleges as follows :
'' 7. That in counting the ballots in eaeh of
the said election districts the election judges did
in a great number of instances fail to count for
plaintiff ballots in which persons had marked their
x in the square opposite the name of the plaintiff
when no line was drawn through the name of thr
person on the opposite ticket. That in 1nany instances voters would vote the emblem in and for
the Progressive Ticket, and then the same voters
made an x in the square opposite the name of
plaintiff, and in counting such ballots, the judgef'
would and did refuse to count such votes for plaintiff.
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"~. That ~PVPrnl ballot:.-, the ex ad numhPr of
which are unkno\\·n to plaintiff, were marked in
the part~· e1nblem cirele of the Progressive Part~·,
and tlw voter would Inark an x in the square oppo:'itP one of the three candidates for 2 year City
Councilman whose nmne appeared under the
Peoples party column, but nothing appeared on
such ballots to di~rlo8e \vhich of the three candidates for ~ year city councihnan on the Progres~ive Ticket the voter intended eliminate by having voted for three thereunder and one on the
Peoples party, and under such ballots the judges
of election did eliminate the vote for the person
voted for individually on the Peoples party ticket,
and the nan1e opposite the name of such candidate
a~ it appeared on the Progressive Partys ticket.

That by such erroneous counting of such ballots
for defendant, he received and was given more
than hvo votes which he was not entitled to have
had counted for him, that were in fact counted for
him." (Record 88)
Defendant Harrison duly demurred to the Statement
of ('on test in the following language:
"That ~aid Ntatement of Contest· and Complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute
a ran~e of action for an election contest agains1
this Defendant and Contestee.
"Defendant and contestee demurs specially
on the ground that the plaintiff and contestant
has not c-omplied with Section 2;)-14-4 Revised
Statute:-; of Utah 1943 in that the correct name of
either plaintiff and contestant or defendant and
ContPstee is not shown; in that said statement of
· eontf·st and complaint does not show what election
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district of the CitY of Roosevelt of which the
plaintiff and cont~stant is a resident; that the
grounds of contest are ambiguous, unintelligible
and uncertain and do not state a cause of action
against this defendant and contestee.
''And in particular that the allegations of said
statement of contest and complaint do not allege
facts sufficient to overcome· the presumption of
legality of the certificate of election duly issued to
the defendant and contestee as shown by the said
complaint.'' (Record 90)
This demurrer was overruled by the Court. (Record
3)
This case was tried by the court on the 23rd day of
February 1948'' (this is error as the case was tried before the court on January 23, 1948). The court made
findings on the evidence on the purported issues. (See
Record 97 to 100)
The court then concludes from the Findings that
the plaintiff, Lynn J ohnstun, was elected to the office
of two-year city councilman of the eit~· of Roosevelt, and
decree was entered accordingly, declaring the election
of the plaintiff, Lynn .Johnstun. (Record 98)
That in counting the votes before the court there
were 69 ballots which were rejected by court and counsel as not being voted for either plaintiff or defendant.
There were five ballots marked Exhibits which appear
in the record, two of whieh were counted by the court for
plaintiff and three for the defendant. (Rec. 75-77)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

rrhat not one of the 69 and not one of said five votes
were voted in the manner set forth in either or all of the
plaintiff's statement of contest.
In other words, there was no evidence whatever to
support any of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint or statement of contest.
There was voted and counted for the contestant two
Ballots, Exhibits 2 and 3, wherein two voters voted by
check mark Yery similar in design, from which the judges
of election, who may have had some inf()rmation upon
the subject, might readily agree that the two votes so
cast and so similar were voted as a means of identification. (Rec. 71 and 72)
That the court allowed costs to the contestant in the
sum of $64.80. (Rec. 103)
One ballot was cast at the election for the contestee
J. H. Harrison. The stub was not detached from the ballot, but placed in the ballot box with other ballots. The
court rejected this vote for the contestee. (Rec. 73)
In the trial of said cause it was stipulated that not
one ballot was found in the 69 votes which was rejected
by court and counsel wherein the voter had voted the
emblem on the progressive ticket and one on the peoples
ticket, or for the contestant on the peoples ticket.

It was further stipulated that there was no evidence
which justified the opening of the ballots. The record on
thiH stipulation as to district No. 1 is as follows: (Rec.

68)
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"MR. PATTERSON: Just a 1ninute. I would
like to make a record in relation to this. I would
like to call the court's attention to the fact that
in our counting of the ballots there is no instances
where the circle was voted and four votes cast.
THE COURT: Do you· want to make anything for the record on that, 1\fr. Dillman~
MR. DILLMAN:

No.

THE COURT: All right, the record may so
show.''
At the end of the count, (Rec. 75) the following
appears as to Districts Nos. 1 and 2:
":Mr. PATTERSON: _May I make a record
at this time with reference to the votes which were
cast for neither, which have been rejected by this
court. That no vote was voted where the emblem
was voted and where one vote was cast upon the
other side, thus constituting voting for four. There
is only one instance in the votes rejected, that i:::,
in the no-count votes, ·where four was voted, and
in that instance the!· voted in the square of the
Progressive ticket and voted for Lawrence Pack
under the People's ticket with a cross, voting for
four. I call the ronrt 's attention to that.
Then let me add on to that also, Your Honor,
that there is no evidence in the record whatrvPr
to show the situation where two ballots were cast
under the progressive ticket and one ballot w:1s
cast under the 'People's tirket. In othrr words,
that the ballots clearly disclos<~ that thPrP is no
evidence for the o1~der opening the ballots.
THE COURT: What do you want to <lo
about it, ~fr. Patterson~
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:JLR. J>ATTERSOX: 'rell, I 1night as well.
Your Honor, ask the court to set aside the count.
THE COURT: "'"ell, do you want to do it¥
Are you n1aking a formal motion"? Your drawing
the attention of the court to it doesn't mean a
thing, either here or in the Supreme Court. If you
want the court to do anything about it, make ~'our
record, and then we will rule upon it; then we will
haYe it here and also in the Supreme Court.
:JIR. PATTERSON: By reason of the fact
that the counted Ballots, and especially those ballots which have been rejected as to both sides,
clearly show that there is no evidence in support
of the proposition to open the ballots, we now
move that the count be set aside and that the defendant herein be declared the duly elected, qualified and acting councilman of the City of Roosevelt.
THE COURT: Do you resist that, l\f r. Dillmanf
:JfR. DILL:JIAN: Yes.
THE COURT: Here is the court's view on
that matter, and the record may show it. The
evidence respecting errors or unlawful votes is
required. The plaintiff has the burden of proving
that there were errors or there were unlawful
\'otes received, or that there were lawful votes
rejected, and sufficient to change the result of the
election if the errors had not been made. The
plaintiff is required to prove that by a preponderance of the evidence. And that is a preliminary requirement to the opening of the ballots. r~rhe matter is thus res adjudicata upon the determination
of the court on the opening of the ballots, and the
hallots themselves are not competent evidence to
establish the preliminary requirements for the
opening of ballots.
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'rhe eourt is eonscious that such may admit
of perjured testimony. In the event that any witness has wilfully testified falsely he is responsible
under the criminal laws. And if there has been
perjured testiinony, then proper proceedings
should be had to hold the perjurer responsible
under the criminalla ws.
But as far as the contest itself is concerned,
the evidence did, hy a preponderance of the evidenc·e, not only justify but required the order of
opening. The opening has been made, the ballots
have been counted, and if there has been a different situation shown on the count of the ballots, it cannot affect the order for opening or the
determination of the grounds for the opening.
'Thus that becomes res adjudicata in the case.
Therefore, the motion will be denied.
:MR. PATTERSON:

Exception." (Rec. 76)

Tme rule that the ballots are the besrt .evidence of
how the one voted, must apvply alS'o to the proposition a.8
to whether they we.re vorterl in tilt'::': nw1wner alle!Jed iu
plaintiff's complaint.
STATJ1~~1ENT

OF ERROR

THE COURT ERRED AS FOLLO\Vf-i:
1.

In overruling the defendant's demurrer to the

plaintiff's complaint. (Rec. R3)
2.

In opening the ballot pouches, there being no

pleading or evidence to justify the same.
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:~. In it~ Findings of Fad as ~et forth in our statement of the Case, upon which its conclusions and decree
were entered. (Rec. R. 97)

-t In its conclusions of law.
5. In its Decree. The same not being supported by
any evidence or by any finding.
6. In decreeing that the contestant Lynn J ohnstun
was elected to the office of the two-year City Councilman of the City of Roosevelt, Utah, at the election held
in Roosevelt on the -1th day of November, 1947.
7.

That the evidence is insufficient as a matter of
law to justify the findings of the court, the conclusions
and the decree entered pursuant thereto.
8. The plaintiff, by his pleadings, did not conform
to 25-14-4 UCA 1943 in that he did not identify himself
as the plaintiff and the defendant as J. H. Harrison as
required by subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of 25-14-4 UCA 1943.
(See Complaint Rec. P. 83)

9.

That there was voted and counted for the conte~tant two ballot~, Exhibit 2 and 3, wherein two voted
hy check mark very similar in design from which the
judges of election, who may have had some information
upon the subject, might readily agree that the two votes
so cast and so sirnilar were voted as a mea.ns of identification. (Rec. 71 and 72)
rl'hat the court allowed costs to the contestant
in tlw ~um of $G4.80. (Rec. 103)
10.
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11. That the court refused to count for the defendant one ballot found in tl1e ballot box and voted for the
defendant, to which the stub of the ballot was attached.

ARGUMENT
The complaint presents three proposals for alleged
erroneous counting of ballots:

PROPOSAL NO.1:
"7. That in counting the ballots in each of
the said election districts the election judges did
in a great number of instances fail to count for
plaintiff ballots in which persons had marked
their x in the square opposite the name of the
plaintiff when no line was drawn through the
name of the person on the opposite ticket. * * *

PROPOSAL NO.2:
''That in many instances voters would vote
the emblem in and for the Progressive Ticket, and
then the same voters make an x in the square opposite the name of plaintiff, and in counting sneh
ballots, the judges would and did refuse to count
such votes for plaintiff.''

PROPOSAL NO.3:
(See Paragraph 8 of the complaint as set out
on page 84 Rec.)

Point No. 1, to-wit, "The court erred in overruling
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defendant's detnurrer to the plaintiff's complaint" (Rec.
3):
To facilitate the argument on this point, we produce
a sample ballot used at the election insofar as it relates
to the three councilmen voted for:

PROGRESSIVE PARTY

PEOPLE'S PARTY

0

0

For councilman-2-year
LYXN JOHNSTUN

For councilman-2-year

lXI

For councilman-2-year

LAWRENCE PACK

0

For councilman-2-year
SAM 0. WEISS

0

ELMER ELDREDGE

D

For councilman-2-year

J. H. HARRrSON

D

For councilman-2-year

NORMAN MURPHY

0

On proposal No. 1 it is observed that the contestant
~ays

he was not given a ballot because there was a cross

after his name which we have indicated in the above
sample.
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This only tells half the story as a cross under the
emblem of the Progressive Party would entirely eliminate his right to that vote, and likewise a cross after the
names of the three 2-year councilmen on the Progressive
Party would entirely eliminate his right to such vote.
Therefore, it is obvious this point does not state a cause
of action.

On propos,al number 2 the complaint says that the
voter voted the emblem on the Progressive Party and
then put a X for the plaintiff's name under the People's
Party, and complains that this vote was not counted for
him.
The law governing the counting· of these ballots is
set forth in 25-6-21 Laws of 1947, which reads as follows,
insofar as material here:
'' *. * * \ Vhen two or more officers are to he
elected to the same office, the voter may.vote for
the candidates for such office for whom he desires to vote, provided, that if he marks more
squares than the aggTegated nun1ber of names to
be filled on such ticket, the vote shall be ~:ejected
as to such officer. If a voter has placed a eros;-;
in the circle at the head of the ballot and wishes
to vote for a person on another ticket for an office for which nwre than one person is to br
elect~d, he shall s6ratch through the names of the
persons of the party under whose emblem he has
marked a circle, for whom he does not wish to .
vote.''
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Thus it will be seen that, coun:-;pl'~

propo~al

No. 2

does not state a cause of action because the plaintiff
would not be entitled to such vote. A ballot :-;o voted under
proposal number 2 vote~ for four councihnen when only
three can be elected, and the law plainly says that the
vote shall be counted for none of them.
Proposal X urnber 3:

This statement is ambiguous

and uncertain. Apparently the plaintiff means to say:
That the emblem is voted under the progressive ticket.
Then the voter marks a cross for smneone of the three
councilmen under the People'~ ticket. That means voting
for four, and therefore none should count. There is no
one scratched under the Progressive ticket. But he goes
on to say: The judges then eliminated the vote for the
person voted for under the People's ticket, and also the
name opposite the name of such candidate as it appeared
on the Progressive ticket. This means nothing. For instance, turn back to the sample ballot above and place a
cross after the name of Lawrence Peck under the People's
party. Then his allegation would mean that the name
of J. H. Harrison opposite the name of Lawrence Peck
would likewise be eliminated. If this were true, it would
not affect the vote for Lynn J ohnstun in any manner.
Nnrely Proposal No. 3 does not state a cause of action.
'rJ1en, again, under this point one, we direct the
court"s attention to Assignment No. 8 under statement
of error hereof, wherein it is clear that the plaintiff has
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not complied with the clear mandatory provisions of
25-14-4 UCA 1943, in failing to properly identify himself andto properly identify the defendant, and also failing to give us a clear statement of the matters complained of.

Points Nos. 2 to 7 inclusive, with reference to the
Findings, Decree and evidence may be considered together.
Suffice it to say that there was nothing in the pleadings to support the findings and nothing in the pleadings to support the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff
and nothing in the pleadings which justified the court
in making its order to open the ballots. In other words,
we could admit the entire allegations of the complaint
and there would be nothing to justify the court in opening the ballot pouches.

Poilnt 8 is incorporated under point 1 going to the
necessary allegations of the complaint.

Point 9: Here is presented the two exhibits which
the court counted for the complainant. They were voted
by check marks. Just two of them in the entire record and
in the same district, and voted precicely alike except as
to one candidate. Such voting could readily serve the
purpose of identifying the two ballots, and furthermore
the election judges may have had some specific information that they were so identified.
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It is true that under the new statute this eourt has
held that a vote shall not be denied whPre a check mark
is used in lieu of the cross, but it does not appear that
the situation wa~ such as to give rise to the identification
of ballots thus cast.

Point 10: The court in this case allowed costs to the
contestants. Of course, there are many instances in election contests where costs should properly be allowed, but
we cannot believe that our statute is all-controlling in
cases of this character. The man whose right to office,
and who has been inducted into office, is challenged, has
no recourse as a citizen having been elected to public
office but to defend the position to which he was elected.
It was his duty to do so and while he did enter into the

contest in defense of his office, he might have refused
to answer or reply to the contest; the court nevertheless
would have been required to sun1nwns the same witnesses
and go to the same expense of trial which was pursued
in this case, and yet the cost would fall upon the defendant. This appears to u:;; to be materiall~r unfair, especially when no extraordinary cost \vas caused by the defendant himself. He stood upon his rights and claimed the
office, but did not call a witness. In any event we feel
that the $64.80 costs charged against him are improper.

Point 11. The election judges are set up by law to
control the voting of the elector. These judges pFnnitted
this vote with the stub attached, to be placed in the hal-
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lot box. It was clearly their own duty to see that the ballot, after it was voted, was properly disposed of; that is
to say, it was their duty to see that the stub was detached before the ballot was dropped into the box. This
is purely an error of the election judges and not of the
voter. That is not all. When the ballots come out of the
box for counting they should then have detached the
stub and placed it where itbelonged and counted the ballot for the defendant. This was denied to him.
We come now to a general discussion of points from
one to 7 inclusive and point out to the court wherein
we insist that the pleading and evidence was insufficient
to justify the opening of the ballots. Please refer to the
stipulation set forth in Rec. 68 and 75.
It will be observed that both court and counsel agree
that there was not one ballot voted as alleged in the
plaintiff's complaint. After the evidence was in, this matter was called to the attention of court and counsel, and
virtually stipulated that there was no evidence supporting the complaint and no ballots cast as alleged in the
complaint.
The court took the position, however, that even
though there was perjury in the execution of the complaint and perjury in the evidence relating to the voting,
that, nevertheless the court could do nothing about it;
that our remedy was by criminal prosecution; that the
matter of determining whether the ballot pouches shoultl
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be opened \Ya~ re~ adjudicata even though the testimony
upon that point wa~ perjured and P\·en thong·h the verification of the cmnplaint wa~ likewi~e a perjun~.
'Ye believe that it i~ the rule that court~ do not set
aside a verdict or decision on the ground of perjured
testimony, except in specific cases in equity, but we do
not believe that the trial court was justified in sidestepping this issue when the perjury appeared, as shown
by the stipulation, in the course of the trial.
Let us look at the findings of the court upon this
particular point: In its sumn1ary of findings, we find the
following:
'• The court at the conclusion of the evidence
did determine and find that votes had prob,ably
been counted for the contestee to which the contestee was not entitled, in sufficient number that
it would change the result of the election." (Rec.

p. !19)
So we see that the trial court's idea was, that if there
was pro1Jable cause to believe that the results might be
changed, gave to the eourt the right to open the ballots.
\Ve do not so understand the law. Before ballots can be
opened there should be a prima facie ~howing, founded
upon competent testimoney, under the pleading, that
there would be sufficient change in the count, under the
allegations of the complaint, to justify the opening of
the ballots. A Decree cannot be entered upon a probable
state of facts.
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In this connection, let us quote from the exaggerated
testimony offered by the plaintiff:

Q.

Mr. Harrison, now referring specifically to
a ballot, if there were any, in which the Progressive emblem had been voted, and a cross
placed opposite the name of Lynn J ohnstun
under the People's ticket, describe how that
was counted.

A.

As I said before, -

Q. · The nan1es are all on. the board there and you
can see the relative position if you want to
look.
A.

Yes, I know exactly. A number of times they
would vote for Lynn J ohnstun, put a cross in
front of Lynn J ohnstun 's name there, and
unless there was- as I remember, they didn't
count that at all unless there was a scratch
through some name on the other ticket, unless
there was a line drawn through.
* * * •»

Q.

Now, how many ballots did you observe in
which a cross was placed opposite the name of
Lynn J ohnstun, and si1nilar to that which has
been described to you, in which the ballot
was not counted for Lynn Johnstun?
****

A.

I would say no less than thirty or forty ballots.'' (Rec. 9-10)

This testimony came from the chief witness of the
contestant, and he readily testified that there were "30
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or 40" ballots 1narked in the t>mhlent of the ProgTPssiYe
ticket and also voting for .J ohnstun on the People's ticket,
which ballots were counted for no one. (Rec. 7-8-9)
Other testinwny of like character and extravagance
was given. But no such ballots were found in the re-count,
as shown by the stipulation. (Hec. 68 and 73)
\Ve think the authorities are not in confli~t to the
effect that, in an election contest, just the same as in all
civil suits, the pleadings must be supported by .the evidence; and finding supported by pleading. Citing authorities: Hamer r. Ho1cell, 31 Utah, 144,86 Pac. 1073:
'' \Yhile the weight of authority holds that
statutes governing contested elections should be
liberally construed in order that justice may be
done, we do not understand that this rule of liberal
construction may be extended so as to overturn
the well-established rule of practice that the ,evidence m1.t-st be confilned to the issues raised by the
pleadings, and that the judgment rendered must
conform the11eto. And our attention has been called
to no case which holds that in proceedings of this
kind, or, for that matter, in any other class of
civil actions, questions Ina~· be tried and determined which are pntirely outside of the issues. In
the case of Boardman Y. (l riffin, :>2 Ind. 101, in
the course of the opinion, the court sa~'s: 'The
parties must recover upon the allegations of tl1e
pleadings. The~· must reeover secun1dum allegata
et probata or not at all. It must be so from the
natnre of thing:-;, so long as our nwde of administering justice prevails. ·n would be folly to reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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quire the plaintiff to state his cause of action anti
the defendant to disclose his grounds of defense,
if, on the trial, either or both might abandon such
grounds and recover upon others which are substantially different from those alleged.' This case
is cited with approval in Borders v. Williams, 153
Ind. 36, 57 N.E. 527, where it is said: 'We perceive no ground for the contention that in contested election cases the procedure is more liberal
than on the trial of other civil causes with respect to the issues and evidence. The statute requires the contestor to specifically state in hi~
complaint the grounds of contest relied upon.''
( l\1any cases cited.)
''Counsel for appellant contend that the matters ·embraced in the challenges referred to come
within and are covered h)· the first alleged ground
of contest set forth in the complaint and designated as 'ground No. 1,' and which is set out in
full in the foregoing statement of facts. By an
examination of that paragraph of the complaint,
it will be seen that it alleges a conclusion only,
and contains no statement of fact. Now the same
general rule of civil pleading which requires the
plaintiff to set forth in his complaint the facts
upon which he bases his right for relief governs
in this class of cases. In fact subdivision 4, Sec.
917, Rev. St. 1898, provides that the contestant
shall set out in his petition' the particular grounds
of contest,' and section 919 in effect provides that
this shall be done, 'with such certainty as will
advise the defendant of the particular proceeding
or cause for which such election is contested.' In
15 Cyc. 405, this same rule is announced as follows: 'In statutory proceedings to contest an elertion the contestant's initial pleading, whethe1: it
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he termed a declaration, eomplaint, petition, or
notice and ~tate1nent, mu~t set forth the particular
facts relied upon a~ invalidating the election of
his opponent in order that the latter may be apprised of the c.a~e he has to meet. Thus an allegation that the contestant rereived nwre votes than
the contestee i~ an avennent of a conclusion, * * *
and when pleaded as an independent ground of
contest will be regarded as surplusage.'' (Emphasis ours)
The case of Hamer Y. Howell, supra, is cited with
approval in the case of Frantz v. Hanson, 104 Utah 112,
140 Pac. 2d 636.
To show that the rules of pleading must be complied
with, we find the following in this case of Frantz v.
Hanson:
'' vVe find that Frantz was really the one
elected, but in the absence of a cross appeal our
judgment can go only so far as to hold that Hanson cannot prevail on his appeal, which leave the
judgment as the lower court made it." (Frantz
failed to file a cross-appeal, an essential of pleading and procedure.)
Bearing upon this question and also upon the sanctity
of a certificate of election, the Colorado court, in the case
of Quigley v. Ph.~lps, 132 Pac. 742, had thii-\ to say:
"In conclusion, we say that if the Legislature
had intended that the entire vote of an)' county,
and for the same reason, of every count~· in the
state, should he recounted upon mere demand (and
that i~ what the appellants' contention amounts
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to) ii would have been easy to so state. If it was
intended that the certificate of election based upon
the official count by the election officers should
have no force as against an unsupported charge
of fraud or incompetence on their part, and that
official action shall no longer possess even a
prima facie presumption of rectitude, then the
legislature should have so stated. If such is to be
declared the public policy of this state, then the
functions of election officials will become an idle
form ..Much time and expense would be saved by
simply limiting their duties to a mere reception
and sealing the ballots and delivering them to the
courts for counting in the first instance.
''We find no abuse of discretion in the refusal of the trial court to recount the ballots, in
the absence of any evidence of mal-conduct on
the part of the election officials.''
We quote the following from the case of Evans
Rte·iser, 78 Utah 253, 2 Pac. 2d 615:

l'.

"* * * Exhibit 414 has a part of the top torn
off. We must assume that this ballot was not so
torn when it was handed to the judges of election
after the voter had marked his ballot. The judges
of election are required to tear off the stub of the
ballot after it has been marked and before it is
placed in the ballot box. If the ballot was torn before it was handed to the judges of election, it is
difficult to see how the stub could have been attached. In the absence or proof to the contrary
it must be assumed that the judges of election
performed their duty, and if they performed their
duty Exhibit 414 rnust have been torn after the
ballot was marked by the voter.
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'' * * * TlH' elector~ eannot be disfranchised
h~· declaring their Yotp~ yoid for an act or iinis~
~ion of ~ome election officer, or smne one else,
unless such ad or on1ission violates some express
constitutional or statutory proYision, or amounts
to intin1idation or fraud.
"Under sueh ciretunstances, the respondent
may not be heard to complain. The failure of the
judges of election to draw six excessive ballots
from the ballot box in district 54 may not be taken
advantage of by the respondent where, as here, it
appears that the failure of the judges of election
to perform their duty in such respect did not and
eould not change the result.''
1 1~urther

quoting from 25-6-21, Laws of 1947:

''No ballot furnished by the proper officer
shall be rejected for any error in stamping or
writing the indorsements thereon by the officials
charged with such duties, nor because of any error on the part of the officer charged with such
duty in delivering the wrong ballots at any polling place, but any ballot delivered by the proper
official to any voter shall, if prroperly m(JJfked by
the rater, b1e counted as cast for all c:andidaJtles for
u:hom the voter, ha,d the riqht to vote, and for
u'lwm he has t'ofed." (Emphasis ours)
In conclusion let us say:
First: The trial court, counted out the contestant
two votes ahead of the contestee. If the ballot cast for
the contestee, from which the stub was not detached, were
g-iven to the contestee and the two ballots voted by check
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mark, which the trial court gave to the contestant, were
deducted from the trial court's figures, the contestee
would have one vote in excess of the contestant.
Second: We believe that the courts of this state are
assuming a more strict attitude as time goes on with
reference to the evidence required for a recount. Just to
permit any one to come in with any kind of a false statement, unsupported by evidence, and secure the recount
of ballots, presents us with the greatest subterfuge and
fraud in such matters thus far encountered. The door
would certainly be wide open for the recounting of ballots upon a mere supposition that a recount, regardles?
of allegations of complaint, would change the results. \Ve
insist such is not the law.
Third: We respectfully submit that the certificate
of election, duly issued to the contestee, cannot be impeached by the pleadings in this case, and certainly not
on the stipulated evidence.
We very respectfully submit that the decision of the
trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully,
GEORGE S. STEWART,
Roosevelt, Utah
PATTERSON AND BAYLES,
203-5 Boston Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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